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China-Gulf Cooperation Council Free
Trade Agreement
GONZALO VILLALTA PUIG AND ALICE TUNG HO YEE

Abstract
The free trade agreement between China and the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) currently under negotiation is due to become China’s first
comprehensive trade and investment agreement with a supranational
customs union. The article explores the challenges and opportunities of the
proposed China-GCC Free Trade Agreement. It proposes tailor-made
recommendations according to the specific interests of both parties.

I.

Introduction

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) comprises Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). China
and the GCC countries are WTO Members and thus are parties to WTO
agreements such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Moreover,
China has embraced the significance of bilateral Free Trade Agreements
(FTAs) to continuous growth.1 China’s past FTAs are mainly signed with
 Gonzalo Villalta Puig is Head of the School of Law and Politics, Professor of Law and
Chair of the Constitutional Law of Economic Integration at The University of Hull. He is an
Overseas Fellow of the Australian Academy of Law and a Fellow of the European Law
Institute. Prof Villalta Puig is chair of the Research Group for Constitutional Studies of Free
Trade and Political Economy of the International Association of Constitutional Law and a
member of the Study Group on Preferential Trade and Investment Agreements of the
International Law Association. He is a member of the Full Council of the International Law
Association. Prof Villalta Puig is Associate Editor of the Global Journal of Comparative
Law (Brill Nijhoff). He is an Outstanding Fellow of the Faculty of Law, The Chinese
University of Hong Kong.
1. John Whalley et al., China’s Regional and Bilateral Trade Agreements, (Institute of
World Economics and Politics, Working Paper No. 201408, 2014), http://eniwep
.cssn.cn/webpic/web/eniwep/upload/2014/04/d20140410153552466.pdf.
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small economies, showing “big country morality”2 by entering into FTAs
to help smaller nations but not to reap the benefits of large trade volumes.
On the other hand, the GCC has signed FTAs with Singapore in 2008 and
with the European Free Trade Association (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway,
Switzerland) (EFTA) in 2009.
This article makes recommendations for a proposed free trade
agreement (the proposed FTA) between China and the GCC (Parties) under
negotiation, a process formally launched in 2004.3 It aims to address
critical issues during Sino-GCC negotiations, thereby analyzing the
prospects and challenges of the proposed FTA, especially in services and
investment. It can serve as prelude to a wider GCC-ASEAN FTA.4 It has
three parts. Part One analyzes the political economy and security
considerations that help to understand the needs of the Parties. Part Two
examines the trade interdependence between the Parties and the negotiation
progress. Part Three analyzes the key issues of the proposed FTA and
makes recommendations. The article concludes that capacity building
should be the predominant objective of the proposed FTA.

II. Political Economy and Security Considerations
China’s political system is dominated by the Communist Party of
China (CPC) without judicial checks. For the CPC, law is only a means of
governance. Thus, rule of law is weak in China. It values collective
prosperity rather than human rights.5
On the other hand, the GCC was formed in 1981 for external security
purposes. Its members are energy-rich monarchies that share mutual political
and security interests. The society is highly hierarchical.6 Human rights
have been disregarded by the various GCC governments.7
2. Zha Daojiong, China’s Economic Diplomacy Focusing on the Asia-Pacific Region, 1(1)
CHINA QUARTERLY OF INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES 85, 85-104 (2015).
3. JORGE MONGAY, BUSINESS AND INVESTMENTS IN ASIA: NEW CHALLENGES, NEW
OPPORTUNITIES, 193 (ESIC Editorial, 1st ed. 2012).
4. Nasser H Saidi, The Gulf Should Pivot East and Build the ‘New Silk Road’, THE
HUFFINGTON POST Apr. 15, 2014 (last updated June 15, 2014), http://www.huffington
post.com/dr-nasser-h-saidi/the-gulf-should-pivot-eas_b_5010038.html.
5. Olivia Enos, Why China’s Human Rights Violation Do Matter, daily signal, Sept. 23,
2015, http://dailysignal.com/2015/09/23/why-chinas-human-rights-violations-do-matter/
6. TAREQ Y. ISMAEL, M IDDLE EAST P OLITICS TODAY : GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL
S OCIETY 339 (2001).
7. Jennifer Fenton, “Significant Ramping” of Political Repression in the Gulf, Activists
Warn, ALJAZEERA AM., Apr. 15, 2015, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/4/15/bahrainhuman-rights-gcc-monarchies.html.
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The rapid growth in oil production enables the rulers of the GCC
countries to entrench their authority. Citizens rely on oil revenue to achieve a
higher rank in social hierarchy.8 Thus, the GCC governments depend on oil
production to prevent dissent apart from external security.
Concerning foreign policy, China has adopted a non-interventionist
policy and did not compete with the United States to protect the Gulf’s
stability before the 9/11 terrorist attack. Besides, the 1991 Gulf War made
China’s approach to insulate itself from the Gulf impossible.9 The crisis in
Libya and Sudan in 2011 and the Iran nuclear deal in 2015 prompted China
towards a more balanced approach towards the GCC countries.10 Since
2008, China has been discovering key national interests in the GCC.11 It
seeks to safeguard its assets and citizens in the Gulf. China has changed its
diplomatic strategy towards the GCC from non-intervention to active
pragmatism.12
Meanwhile, the GCC has placed vital importance on security.
Notably, political challenges caused by the Iran-Iraq War highlight the
significance of political commitment for enhancing integration of the
GCC.13 Political events like the Arab Spring and the 9/11 attack have
stimulated the GCC countries to handle their affairs free from US and
European Union interference.14 Regarding China as a constructive force to
enhance its stability,15 the GCC has pursued the “looking east policy” to
seek opportunities for strategic partnership with China.16
Notably, the Parties share a strong interest in safeguarding domestic
stability.17 As China highly depends on oil imports from the GCC, it seeks to

8. Ismael, supra note 7 at 341.
9. See John Calabrese, China and the Persian Gulf: Energy and Security, 52 MIDDLE EAST
J. 351, 366 (1998).
10. Lars Erslev Andersen & Yang Jiang, Oil, Security, and Politics: Is China Challenging
the US in the Persian Gulf?, 29 DANISH INST. FOR INT’L STUD. 1, 6 (2014).
11. Wu Bingbing et al., China and the Persian Gulf: Implications for the United States,
WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS 1, 10 (2011), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/
default/files/ASIA%20Program_China%20and%20the%20PG.pdf.
12. Andersen & Jiang, supra note 11 at 6.
13. Gonzalo Villalta Puig & Amer Al-Khodiry, The Economic and Monetary Union of
the Gulf Cooperation Council, 46 J. OF WORLD TRADE 121, 140-41 (2012).
14. Andersen & Jiang, supra note 11 at 5.
15. Chen Mo, Exploring Economic Relations Between China and the GCC States, 5(4)
J. OF MIDDLE EASTERN & ISLAMIC STUDIES. 88, 102 (2011).
16. Andersen & Jiang , supra note 11 at 41.
17. Jon B. Alterman, China’s Balancing Act in the Gulf, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L
STUDIES, 3 (2013).
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ensure the stability of energy relations.18 Meanwhile, the GCC hopes to
safeguard its energy reserves. Thus, it shields Chinese interests in the Middle
East from threats19 to the security of shipping links. Moreover, the Parties
have to work together to safeguard the sea lanes emerging from China’s
One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative.
Sino-GCC disagreement over global responses to the Syrian conflict
hampered their negotiations in 2009.20 Nonetheless, both sides agreed to
facilitate political settlement on the Syrian disagreement in 2014 and even
expressed the urgency of peaceful political settlement of Syria in 2016.21
Both sides oppose terrorism. This common approach favors their
cooperation toward security in the context of a wider strategic partnership.
As for economic policy, China pursues “going-out” strategies and
regards service as the priority.22 China promotes “supply-side structural
reform”,23 which includes technological innovation and infrastructure.
Notably, Xi launched the OBOR initiative in 2015.24 It aims to link China to
Europe and the Middle East.25
The GCC members have committed to integrate their economies since
the establishment of the GCC. The GCC became a Custom Union in 2003.26 Its
common market status was declared in 2008 and has long aspired for the
establishment of single GCC currency.27 Yet, its economic integration remains
difficult because of its structural weaknesses, persistent obstacles to cross-border
18. Mike Burnham, Georgetown Security Studies Review: China in the Middle East, GEO.
U. CTR. FOR SECURITY STUD. (2015), http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/07/GSSR-Asia-Conference.pdf.
19. Id.
20. Adel Al Toraifi, Chinese Foreign Minister: Our position on Syria is objective
ASHARQ AL AWSAT (2014), http://english.aawsat.com/2014/03/article55330119/ chinese-foreignminister-our-position-on-syria-is-objective-and-fair.
21. Saudi Arabia, China issue joint communiqué on establishing comprehensive strategic
partnership between the two countries, ALYAMAMH, (Mar. 19, 2016),http://www.alriyadh.com
/en/article/1121322/Saudi-Arabia-China-issue-joint-communiqu-on-establishing-comprehensivestrategic-partnership-between-the-two-countries.
22. China – Minutes of the Meeting, ¶ 1.7., WTO Doc. WT/TPR/M/300 (Aug. 26, 2014)
[Hereinafter China Meeting Minutes].
23. China’s ‘supply-side structural reform’ to boost new economy’, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 31,
2015, http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-12/31/content_22885281.htm.
24. Wu Sike, Constructing “One Belt and One Road” and Enhancing the China-GCC
Cooperation, 9(2) J. OF MIDDLE EASTERN & ISLAMIC STUD., 1, 1-15 (2015).
25. Id.
26. Theodore Karasik, The GCC’s New Affair with China, MIDDLE EAST INST. (2016),
http://www.mei.edu/content/map/gcc%E2%80%99s-new-affair-china.
27. Ali Al-Abdulrazzaq & Kevin Carey, Economic Integration in the GCC, THE WORLD
BANK (2010), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/GCC Studyweb.pdf.
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mobility within the GCC and different regulatory frameworks.28
While the GCC heavily relies on oil revenue, oil is exhaustible.29 To
cope with uncertainties in the international oil market, the GCC countries
promote privatization and utilize oil revenue for economic diversification.
They are also invest more in manufacturing and services.30 As the
technological and managerial intelligence of Chinese financial firms have
become increasingly competitive, their penetration into GCC markets
would stimulate the diversification of the GCC economies’ from energy
production to services.31 Yet, most private sector jobs are still filled by
foreign workers.32 Thus, diversification in the GCC still faces obstacles
such as the failure to generate significant job opportunities for nationals.

III. Origins and Development
To bolster economic growth, China is interested in deepening trade
and investment ties with the GCC.33 It perceives the GCC as a paramount
partner, especially in energy.34 China is predicted to become the largest
exporter to the GCC by 2020.35
In regards to the OBOR initiative, Saudi Arabia has expressed its
willingness to participate in establishing interconnectivity in the GCC as it
stands at a crucial junction along OBOR routes.36 The GCC views the OBOR
as a natural partner that promotes mutual benefits by its deeper investment in
China including renewable energy, infrastructure, aviation, finance and
telecommunications.37 These opportunities would be enticements for both
sides to support OBOR and favor the conclusion of the proposed FTA.

28. Ali Al-Abdulrazzaq & Kevin Carey, supra at note 27.
29. Tim Callen & Reda Cherif, Economic Diversification in the GCC: Past, Present, and
Future, IMF STAFF DISCUSSION NOTE (2014), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2
014/sdn1412.pdf.
30. Michael Thorpe & Sumit Mitra, Growing Economic Interdependence of China and the
Gulf Cooperation Council, SOC. SCI. RESEARCH NETWORK (2008).
31. Mo, supra note 15.
32. Callen & Cherif, supra note 29.
33. Matteo Legrezi & Fred H. Lawson, China’s Gulf Policy: Existing Theories, New
Perspectives, 22 (2) MIDDLE EAST POLICY 58, 58-71 (2015).
34. Wu, supra note 24.
35. Robert Bailey, China and GCC: Growing Ties, GULF BUSINESS, Apr. 16, 2013,
http://www.gulfbusiness.com/articles/insights/china-and-gcc-growing-ties/.
36. GCC and China Decide to Speed up Free Trade Talks, SAUDI GAZETTE, Jan. 21, 2016,
http://saudigazette.com.sa/saudi-arabia/gcc-and-china-decide-to-speed-up-free-trade-talks/.
37. Id.
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The Parties began negotiations in 2004. Both sides started to
negotiate service trades after agreeing in principle to trade in goods in 2009
but the talks halted in the same year. The Saudi Crown Prince visited
Beijing in March 2014.38 Sino-GCC negotiations for the FTA resumed in
December 2015.39 Subsequently, Xi met with Saudi Arabia’s Deputy
Crown, Prince Mohammed bin Salmon on January 19, 2016. They have
agreed to expedite progress to conclude a comprehensive FTA by the end
of 2016.40 Meanwhile, the two sides agreed to elevate their ties to a
strategic partnership.41 The sixth round of China-GCC official negotiation
was held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia from February 29 to March 3, 2016.42
Subsequently, the Parties held the seventh round of negotiations in Guangzhou
from May 8 to 10, 2016.43 They have achieved positive progress in issues such
as trade in services, investment and technological cooperation.44
Unlike China’s past FTAs, the major driving force of this agreement is
the significant energy trade between the Parties. Consider the Parties’ FTAs.
The China-Australia FTA (“ChAFTA”) is China’s first comprehensive FTA
signed with a strong developed country in the west, making most achievements
in service and investment liberalization.45 The GCC-Singapore FTA
(“GSFTA”) is the first FTA signed by the GCC with an Asian country.46 It has

38. ZHA DAOJIONG & MICHAEL MEIDAN, CHINA AND THE MIDDLE EAST IN A NEW
ENERGY LANDSCAPE, 9 (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2015), https://www.chath
amhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/20151021ChinaMiddleEastEnr
gyDaojiongMeidan.pdf.
39. China, GCC Vow to Reach Comprehensive FTA within 2016, MINISTRY OF
COMMERCE, PRC (Jan, 28, 2016), http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/engcc/engccnews
/201601/30498_1.html.
40. Bailey, supra note 35.
41. China, Saudi Arabia Elevate Bilateral Ties, Eye More Industrial Capacity
Cooperation, XINHUA, Jan. 20, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/20/c_
135025406.htm.
42. The 6th Round of China - GCC FTA Negotiations Held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, MINISTRY
OF COMMERCE, PRC (Mar. 10, 2016), http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle /engcc/engccnews/201603/30
938_1.html.
43. Id.
44. The 7th Round of China - GCC FTA Negotiation Concluded, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, PRC
(May 12, 2016), http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/significantnews/201605/2016
0501316237.shtml.
45. Interpretation for China - Australia Free Trade Agreement, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, PRC
(June 19, 2015), http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/Cocoon/ 201510/20151 00
1144954.shtml, [hereinafter Interpretation for China-Australia Free Trade Agreement].
46. Kevin Körner, The GCC Going East, DEUTSCHE BANK, Feb. 18, 2014, at 4,
https://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD00000000003296
87/The+GCC+going+East%253A+Economic+ties+with+developing+Asia+on+the+rise.pdf.
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been asserted that the proposed FTA would build upon the GSFTA.47
China considered its past FTAs as learning lessons for potential FTAs
with sequential trading partners.48 Yet, the Chinese approach to FTAs is not to
adopt a template for all, but customize a negotiating strategy according to the
interests of the trading partners.49 For instance, the China-ASEAN agreement
emphasizes broad commitments of developmental cooperation, not precise
commitments. In contrast, the China-New Zealand FTA (“NZCFTA”) favors
more precise commitments than developmental cooperation.
In addition, it would be rewarding to draw insights from innovative
provisions from successful FTAs worldwide,50 notably the Canada-EU
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (“CETA”). CETA has been
praised for prescribing a ‘new gold standard’ for international FTAs.51 Hence,
selected WTO-plus innovations in the ChAFTA, GSFTA and CETA will be
referred to in this article.

IV. Challenges and Opportunities
A.

Experience from the Failure of EU – GCC FTA
Negotiations

FTA negotiations between the EU and the GCC stalled for a number of
reasons. The first hindrance to EU-GCC FTA negotiations was disagreement
over human rights and democratic processes.52 The European Parliament
insisted on imposing a human rights clause which the GCC countries53
perceived as a political condition to any final agreement.54 Secondly, the
GCC countries hoped to gain technical assistance for their deepening

47. Saidi, supra note 4.
48. Whalley, supra note 1 at 9.
49. Id. at 10-11.
50. Christina L. Davis, The Political Logic of Dispute Settlement: Introduction to the Special
Issue, 15(2) THE REV. OF INT’L ORG. 12 (2015), replicated at https://www.princeton.edu/~cldavis
/files/ROIO_DavisIntro.pdf.
51. Constantine Passaris, CETA - Greece’s Saviour?, OPENCANADA.ORG, Dec. 2, 2014,
https://www.opencanada.org/features/ceta-greeces-saviour/.
52. Id.
53. M. Anaam Hashmi, Is There A Need for A Free Trade Agreement between the European
Union and Gulf Cooperation Council?, 13(1) INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & ECONOMICS
RESEARCH JOURNAL 113, 113-120 (2014).
54. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, THE GULF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
(International Political Economy Series, 1st ed. 2015).
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regional integration.55 Yet the EU made limited contributions to integrate the
GCC into global markets.56 Institutional differences and conflicting cultural
values further hindered the progress of EU-GCC negotiations.57 Thirdly, the
GCC was unhappy with the EU’s high tariffs on petrochemical exports.58 The
EU claimed that the high level of tariffs was justified by the subsidies received
by Gulf producers. Building the relationship upon the reasons for these various
disagreements is the key to any eventual resumption of FTA talks.59
Unlike EU-GCC FTA negotiations, the Parties would not face the same
deadlock as to human rights clause because they do not show much concern
for these considerations. Besides, Sino-GCC negotiations are unlikely to be
hindered by conflicting values. Both Parties have appreciated the significance
of people-to-people exchanges to deepen cooperation.60 The OBOR initiative
would add substance to people-to-people cooperation by facilitating cultural
exchanges. Besides, Chinese Confucianism respects diversity.
While
conflicting cultural values are unlikely to be a setback as in EU-GCC
negotiations, China needs to recognize Islamic cultural exceptions.
Nonetheless, the major challenge to the proposed FTA concerns the
Chinese’s determination to restrict access of GCC petrochemical exporters to
its markets. The GCC suspects China desires to shield domestic producers
from international competition.61 Thus, current negotiations with China seem
to resemble talks with the EU regarding petrochemical issues. This difficulty
may imply the need for China to make concessions so as not to protect
domestic producers persistently.

B. Trade in Goods
The Parties “substantially concluded in principle the negotiations on
trade in goods” in January 2016. Both sides had actually agreed on the
market access of 97 percent of goods in 2009. According to World Tariff
Profile 2015, China’s simple average Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff
55. Rym Ayadi, Relations between EU & Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries,
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT at 17 & 21 (Oct. 25, 2010), http://www.europarl.europa
.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2010/433742/EXPO-AFET_NT(2010)433742_EN.pdf.
56. Hashmi, supra note 53.
57. Valentina Kostadinova, What is the Status of the EU - GCC Relationship?, GULF
RESEARCH CENTER, at 3-4, 10 (2013), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/167338/EU-GCC_9227.pdf
58. Ayadi, supra note 55.
59. Kostadinova, supra note 57, at 3.
60. China, GCC Agree to Accelerate FTA Negotiations, NEWS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
CHINA, Jan. 16, 2016, http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66102/7706041.html.
61. Ulrichsen, supra note 54.
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rate was 9.6% in 2014. The average tariff for agricultural products is
15.2% while the average tariff for nonagricultural products is 8.6% in
2014. On the other hand, the simple average MFN tariff rates in 2014 for
the main GCC member, Saudi Arabia, is 5.1%. Its average tariff for
agricultural and non-agricultural products are 5.9% and 5% respectively.
In the same year, the other two main GCC members, Qatar and the UAE,
have simple average MFN tariff rates of 4.7%. Qatar has an average tariff
of 5.3% for agricultural products while the UAE is 5.4%. The average for
non-agricultural products is commonly 4.6%. Thus, China has higher
simple average tariff rates than those of GCC countries. In particular,
China’s higher tariff rate for agricultural products shows higher protection
of its domestic production of agricultural products.
To be WTO-compatible, GATT Article XXIV:8 provides for the
elimination of ‘duties and other restrictive regulations’ with respect to
‘substantially all the trade’ between the parties. Quantitatively, the standard
requires 90% of tariffs to be removed.62 Considering the tariff elimination
schedules of past FTAs, over 85% of Australia’s exports entered China
duty free when ChAFTA came into force and an additional 8% upon full
implementation. GSFTA eliminated tariffs on 93.3% of goods of
Singaporean origin when it came into force while an additional 2.7% will
phase out after a five-year transitional period. Hence, the Parties’ past
FTAs generally meet the benchmark of 90% and support the approach of
eliminating most of the tariffs immediately at date of entry into force, leaving a
small percentage to gradually phase out after a specified transitional period.
Generally, the Parties impose low tariff rates for non-agricultural
products. While the GCC countries rely on Chinese imports for industrial
products,63 China imports metals from the GCC.64 Notably, the UAE has
exported a significant amount of aluminum to China, thus it has called for
the elimination of tariffs on aluminum.65 Meanwhile, China’s chemical
market has experienced double-digit growth since 2013.66 This growth
62. Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION on the conclusion of an Association Agreement
between the European Community and its Member States of the one part, and the Republic of
Chile, of the other part, EUR-LEX Document 52002PC0536(02) ¶ 6 (2002).
63. Mo, supra note 15.
64. Assessing Investment Policies of Member Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council,
MENA - OECD Investment Programme, at 12, presented on Apr. 5, 2011, http://www.
oecd.org/mena/competitiveness/Preliminary%20assessment%20GCC%20invt%20policies.pdf.
65. Trade Policy Review United Arab Emirates Record of the Meeting, WTO Doc
WT/TPR/M/262, ¶ 156, (May 9, 2012) [hereinafter United Arab Emirates Trade Policy Review].
66. Tahir Ikram, GPCA’14: GCC Eyes More PE, PP Exports to China on Capacity Growth,
ICIS (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.icis.com/resources/news/2014/11/24/9841128/gpca-14-gcceyes-more-pe-pp-exports-to-china-on-capacity-growth/.
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boosts Chinese demand for plastic, a demand that can be largely satisfied
by the GCC. These mutual benefits present opportunities for proactive
market access commitments in relation to manufactured products,
especially chemicals. Nonetheless, other considerations, such as maturity
of industry, would justify the inclusion of short transitional periods for
ultimate tariff elimination.
The GCC has unilaterally stalled negotiations with China, as the GCC
wanted China to eliminate import tariffs on all its products whereas China
insisted on keeping the preset protective tariffs of GCC’s petrochemical
exports to China.67 Despite detriment to domestic producers, it would be
WTO-compatible for both sides to agree on a partial tariff elimination in
order to stimulate final agreement. China’s high dependence on the GCC’s
oil resources for energy security68 would justify the need for China to make
a compromise during negotiations. Yet, the transitional period for tariffs
on petrochemicals to phase out should be longer on two grounds. First, the
GCC’s strong competitiveness in the area of petrochemical products calls
for partial competitive pressures on China’s petrochemical industry. The
second reason concerns the political aspect. As both sides have expressed a
willingness to establish a strategic partnership and conclude the FTA by the
end of 2016,69 this implies that the proposed FTA neither serves to achieve
domestic policy reform nor achieve development goals. Its objective is to
deepen the bilateral relationship in various sectors. Therefore, the scope and
the speed of liberalization is less ambitious.
Petrochemicals aside, the highly sensitive agricultural sector also calls for a
moderate elimination model comprising a longer transitional period for tariffs to
phase out. It would be overly ambitious to agree on full liberalization of
agricultural exports. This is consistent with ChAFTA, where the transitional
period for different agricultural products ranges from seven to nine years.

C. Rules of Origin
There are four methods to assess whether a product is substantially
transformed to confer origin. They are the change in tariff classification
rule (CTCR), the value-added rule (VAR), hybrid rule and specified
process rule (SPR).
Considering China’s past FTAs, ChAFTA applies product specific
67. Stasa Salacanin, GCC - China Rising Trade Value, BQ MAGAZINE, Mar. 23, 2014,
http://www.bq-magazine.com/economy/2014/03/gcc-china-rising-trade-value.
68. Mo, supra note 15.
69. Bailey, supra note 35.
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rules (PSR) to products produced in China that contains non-originating
materials. The PSR adopts three main methods to confer origin to nonoriginating materials such as the CTCR, VAR and SPR. The CTCR is also
adopted as the main rule in NZCFTA, which was signed in 2008.70 The
China-Korea FTA (ChKFTA) signed in 2004 shares the same approach as
ChAFTA with some exceptions that permit a VAR of 40%.71 As for the
China-Singapore FTA (CSFTA), signed in 2008, the VAR is also the major
means to confer origin and the minimum percentage is 40%.72 It seems that
the approach in Chinese FTAs is basically straightforward. They either rely
on the CTCR or VAR to confer origin. However, the recent trend of
Chinese FTAs seems to favour the CTCR as the main rule with the VAR as
a supplement for some products. The dominance of the CTCR in Chinese
FTAs also shows China’s preference for simplicity. The CTCR is satisfied
by the determination of a classification code. The CTCR has been hailed
for its predictability and clarity in application.73
On the GCC’s side, GSFTA requires at least 35% VAR of the exworks price to qualify for preferential treatment. It also adopts the PSR for
10 products, where the origin is assessed by a CTCR. The GCC’s FTA
with EFTA is mainly based on the European model but with less restrictive
rules to chemical products.74 Therefore, it seems that the Rules of Origin
(ROOs) of the GCC’s past FTAs are more complicated and they vary with
the choice of partners to the FTA. For instance, both CSFTA and GSFTA
adopt VAR as the major criteria. This supports the proposition that Singapore
prefers VAR as the main criteria to confer origin. Hence, Singapore’s
preference had a heavy influence on the decision to use VAR as the dominant
rule in GSFTA.
In the light of recent FTA trends, the proposed FTA should adopt
CTCR as the main criterion with the exception of VAR for some products,

70. New Zealand–China Free Trade Agreement: Information about Rules of Origin Import, NEW ZEALAND CUSTOMS SERVICE, at 1 (Nov., 2008), http://www.customs.govt.nz/
news/resources/factsheets/documents/fact%20sheet%2037.pdf.
71. Jeffrey J. Schott, An Assessment of the Korea-China Free Trade Agreement,
PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (2015), (Noting that RVC is
analogous to the value-added-rule), https://www.piie.com/publications/pb/pb15-24.pdf.
72. Benefits of FTA between Singapore and China, BRYAN CAVE INTERNATIONAL
CONSULTING (2013), http://www.iesingapore.gov.sg/~/media/IE%20Singapore/Files/Events
/iAdvisory%20Series/China%202013/420Benefits20of20FTA20between20Singapore20and
20ChinaBryan20Cave.pdf.
73. Erlinda M. & Jenny Balboa, ASEAN Rules of Origin: Lessons and
Recommendations for Best Practice, ERIA DISCUSSION PAPER, at 6 (2009), https://core.ac.uk
/download/files/153/9306182.pdf.
74. EFTA and GCC, EFTA-GCC Free Trade Agreement, June 22, 2009.
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as the GCC is likely to draw reference from its past FTAs and embrace the
approach favored by China. Adopting co-equal rules where the CTCR and
VAR are used together would offer flexibility and reduce costs, thereby
boosting liberalization.75
Furthermore, ROOs may serve as a tool to enhance the foreign policy
interests of a country.76 Increasing ROOs’ restrictiveness motivates
domestic producers to adopt factors of production originating in the territories
of the FTA partner. The international trade literature has recorded many cases
of devising ROOs as a means of domestic protectionism.77 Besides, ROOs
have been recognized as protectionist barriers.78 Therefore, it would be
necessary to pay attention to the sensitive products that are protected by the
protectionist measures of either party.
The restrictiveness of ROOs tends to increase disproportionately to
prevent trade deflection.79
Two types of goods merit deserves
consideration in the light of their ROOs’ restrictiveness because of
increased worldwide competition. First, in order to protect Chinese
agricultural exports against foreign competition, particularly from India,80
more restrictive ROOs would be necessary for agricultural products.
However, some agricultural products can be ingredients for the processed
food of the GCC countries. The ROOs for processed food from the GCC
should not be set too high because processing often requires inputs such as
capital intensive infrastructures, involving much mechanization. If their
ROOs are set very high, the GCC exporters would face high compliance
cost due to their use of capital intensive inputs that cannot be produced
competitively in China. As their processed goods usually require
processing in third countries before they are ready for export, they tend to
become ineligible for preferential access. Hence, technical content –
especially the proportion of capital intensive inputs in a good – would be a
crucial consideration for the restrictiveness of ROOs. It is necessary to
75. Erlinda & Balboa, supra note 73.
76. Moshel Hirsch, The Politics of Rules of Origin, HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM
(June 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2275322.
77. Kerry A. Chasl, Protecting Free Trade – Political Economy of Rules of Origin, 62
INT’L ORG. 507 at 507-530 (2008).
78. Dokki Abdallah El-Kateb St., Free Trade Agreements and Rules of Origin, INTL’S CTR
FOR ECON. GROWTH at 2 (2015), http://www.atdforum.org/IMG/pdf/Policy_Brief_RoO.pdf.
79. Paul Brenton, Enhancing Trade Preferences for LDCs: Reducing the Restrictiveness of
Rules of Origin, THE WORLD BANK, at 281 (2005), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANE
TTRADE/Resources/239054-1126812419270/23.RulesOfOrigin.pdf.
80. Levin Flake, India’s Agricultural Exports Climb to Record High, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE (Aug., 2014),
http://www.fas.usda.gov/data/india-s-agricultural-exports-climb-record-high.
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obtain information regarding the various production processes in order to
analyze the technical content of different goods. This would call for a
specific cooperative framework for consultations and modifications.
GSFTA Article 3.15 would serve as a good reference for this point.
Secondly, clothing and textile generally come under protectionism
because they can be produced with low-skilled labor.81 China is labor rich.
Because of low labor cost, Chinese garments are major exports to GCC
countries.82 However, stringent ROOs might restrain the GCC nations from
reaping the full benefit of preferential measures, thereby counteracting trade
liberation. Notably, research shows that applying restrictive ROOs to
garments is not an effective means to protect domestic industry.83 It should be
noted that Chinese producers have recently increased their use of imported
fabric, especially from Japan and Taiwan.84 Meanwhile, Korean apparel has
become increasingly popular. It would be worthwhile to consider the ROOs
adopted by ChKFTA for textile and apparel which qualify exporters who
satisfy either a CTCR or a 40% VAR threshold for preferential treatment. This
would be preferred to a yarn forward rule where these exports would qualify
for preference only if they are made of yarn or fabric from either party.
More importantly, inclusion of cumulation and de minimis rules are
indispensable, as they help lessen the negative trade effects of restrictive
ROOs. Also, as certification procedure has a direct implication on compliance
cost,85 it would be worthwhile for the Parties to adopt a self-certification
process that can reduce administrative costs to exporters by passing the burden
of proof of origin to importers.

D. Safety Standards
As China and the GCC countries are WTO members, they need to
comply with the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS Agreement”)86 and the Agreement on
Gary Banks, Rules of Origin under Australia - New Zealand Closer Economic Relations
Trade Agreement, 37, AUSTRA. GOV’T PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N RESEARCH REPORT (2004),
http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/trans-tasman-trade-agreement/report/roo.pdf.
82. FTA Talks Reach across the Gulf, CHINA DAILY (Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.china.
org.cn/business/2014-12/30/content_34440629.htm.
83. Erlinda & Balboa, supra note 73.
84. Textile and Apparel Market in China, EU SME CENTRE, 12-13 (2011),
http://www.ccilc.pt/sites/default/files/eu_sme_centre_report_-_textile_and_apparel_market_
in_china_sep_2011.pdf.
85. Erlinda & Balboa, supra note 73.
86. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15,
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Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT Agreement”).87 The SPS Agreement
entails pertinent laws, regulations and requirements for safeguarding health
within the territory of a WTO member from predefined specific risks of
health. The TBT Agreement requires technical regulations and conformity
assessment procedures that protect health to avoid discrimination and
unnecessary barriers to trade, while adhering to the international standards.
They can be used to meet broader objectives than the SPS Agreement.
Therefore, the issues concerning these two agreements would be
considered together in turn. It is important to balance the need of improved
market access by streamlining import control procedures with the
legitimate objectives that justify the restriction of trade.88
The first priority issue arises from the food crisis in China and the
reliance of GCC countries on food imports. The Chinese authorities have
adopted a food security strategy to strive for dominance in the worldwide
supply chain for imported food despite its diminished exports recently. 89
Meanwhile, the GCC countries depend mainly on food imports and at least
one fifth of the population in the GCC countries are expected to face food
insecurity by 2020.90 Their food producers would experience stronger
growth through processed foods made by imported ingredients.91 In particular,
Saudi Arabia has recently reiterated the vital importance of food security as it
is a net wheat importer.92 These favour an opportunity of mutual trade where
China exports grains to the GCC in return for processed food.
Nonetheless, China’s recent food safety scandals such as contaminated
meat products in 2014 and pork from diseased pigs in 201593 would merit
specific consideration during negotiations of the SPS and TBT chapter.

1994 (entered into force Jan 1, 1995), [hereinafter “SPS Agreement.”]
87. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994 (entered into force
January 1, 1995), [hereinafter TBT Agreement].
88. TBT Agreemen, supra note 87 at art. 2.2.
89. Fred Gale, China’s Growing Demand for Agricultural Imports, 19 U.S.D.A. (Feb.
2015), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/1784488/eib136.pdf.
90. Houcine Boughanmi, Food and Agricultural Trade in the GCC: An Opportunity for
South Asia?, 4, UN ESCAP (2014)， http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Food%20an
d%20Agricultural%20Trade%20in%20the%20GCC_Jeevika_Sept2014.pdf.
91. Food International, GCC Food Retail Will be Worth $155 Billion by 2018,
GULFOOD (2015), http://www.gulfood.com/Content/GCC-food-retail-will-be-worth-155billion-by-2018.
92. Trade Policy Review Report by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, WTO Doc
WT/TPR/G/333 (adopted Feb. 29, 2016), [hereinafter Saudi Arabia Trade Policy Review].
93. Chinese Police Arrest More Than 100 People for Selling Contaminated Pork,
FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2015/01/chinesepolice-arrest-over-100-for-selling-contaminated-pork-products/#.VtO66px96Ul.
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The Parties should strike a balance between the importance of market
access and food safety.
Both sides face huge regulatory obstacles concerning the risk
assessment and import checks for imported food. China has intensified its
commitments to boost its existing food safety law, notably China’s Food
Safety Law, which became effective in October 2015.94 The State Food
and Drug Administration regularly formulates laws and regulations to
monitor food safety in general.95 Therefore, processed food imports from
the GCC countries need to satisfy these standards before entering into
China. On the other hand, Chinese grain exports have to satisfy the food
control procedures of the GCC based on GCC Guide for Control on
Imported Foods (GCC Guide)96 and the standards issued by the GCC
Standards Organization (GCCSO).97
Regarding the SPS chapter, Chinese FTAs are mainly modeled on the
SPS Agreement. ChAFTA basically restates WTO principles while
proposing requirements about transparency and the objective of mutual
understanding. The only exception seems to be NZCFTA, which
encompasses aspects regarding the implementation arrangements of SPS
including risk analysis,98 criteria for determination of equivalence99 and
verification100 as well as cooperation in respect of technical assistance.101 It
also prescribes the obligation of timely notification regarding significant
health issues and scientific findings of diseases.102 Likewise, the SPS
chapter of the GCC’s past FTAs is based on the SPS Agreement. Notably,
GSFTA explicitly expresses the objective to “facilitate technical

94. Jennifer Clever, Food and Agricultural Import Regulations and Standards –
Narrative FAIRS Country Report, 4, USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (Dec. 30, 2015),
http://agriexchange.apeda.gov.in/IR_Standards/Import_Regulation/Food%20and%20Agricu
ltural%20Import%20Regulations%20and%20Standards%20%20NarrativeBeijingChina%20
%20Peoples%20Republic%20of12302015.pdf.
95. World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review Report by the Secretariat China,
WTO Doc WT/TPR/S/300 ¶ 3.78 (2014).
96. GCC Guide for Control on Imported Foods, THE GCC AGRICULTURE & FISHERIES
RESOURCES DIRECTORATE (2015), http://sites.gcc-sg.org/DLibrary/index-eng.php?action=Sh
owOne&BID=696.
97. World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review Report by the Secretariat Bahrain,
WTO Doc WT/TPR/S/294 ¶ 3.61 (Mar. 18, 2014).
98. New Zealand-China Free Trade Agreement, N.Z.-China, art. 79, Oct. 1, 2008
[hereinafter NZCFTA].
99. Id. at art. 81.
100. Id. at art. 83.
101. Id. at art. 85.
102. Id. at art. 86.
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consultations.”103 These show that the FTAs of both sides generally affirm the
SPS Agreement without extensive WTO-plus provisions, except NZCFTA.
In contrast, the SPS and TBT chapters in CETA have widely been
recognized as extraordinarily extensive, comprising specific WTO-plus
provisions.104 They contain WTO-plus provisions that would serve as good
reference for the proposed China-GCC FTA. There are two specific
concerns for the Parties to consider. First, the GCC members, especially
Bahrain105 expressly doubt the scientific justification of import checks to
China.106 Recent food scandals undermine the confidence of GCC members
regarding the quality of Chinese food exports and, more importantly, the risk
assessment and export certification. Thus, the Parties should place emphasis
on a well-supported verification of control procedures and import checks for
maintain the confidence of GCC importers. While the “control, inspection
and approval procedures” in ChAFTA are mainly based on the SPS
Agreement,107 the SPS chapter of CETA contains provisions that prescribe
a pathway for trade partners to agree on principles and guidelines
concerning the audit and verification of control procedures.108 It also
consists of specific import requirements for priority commodities.
Therefore, it would be rewarding for the Parties to learn from CETA and
negotiate provisions for quality guidelines for scientific justification. In
particular, both sides should negotiate a specific procedure for import
requirements of those Chinese foods that have been reported as
contaminated, treating them as priority commodities.
Secondly, the GCC members have urged China to improve the
transparency and predictability of its scientific justification.109 GCC
exporters of processed food would hardly know the internal operations and
scientific basis of risk analysis adopted by Chinese authorities. This
question draws attention to the transparency of import control mechanisms.
Meanwhile, China has encouraged Saudi Arabia to enhance transparency
by allowing interested parties to comment on SPS measures.110 In Saudi
103. GCC-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, GCC-Sing., art. 2.11, Sept. 1, 2013
[hereinafter GSFTA].
104. Gonzalo Villalta Puig & Eric D. Dalke, Nature and Enforceability of WTO-plus SPS
and TBT Provisions in Canada’s PTAs: From NAFTA to CETA, 15 WORLD TRADE REV. 51,
54-57 (2015).
105. Saudi Arabia Trade Policy Review, supra note 92 at ¶ 235.
106. China Meeting Minutes, supra note 22 at ¶ 6.3.
107. China-Australia Free Trade Agreement, China-Austl., art. 5.8, Dec. 20, 2015
[hereinafter ChAFTA].
108. Villalta Puig & Dalke, supra note 104, at 67.
109. China Meeting Minutes, supra note 22, at ¶ 6.3.
110. Saudi Arabia Trade Policy Review, supra note 92 at ¶ 89.
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Arabia’s latest WTO trade policy review meeting, it specifically called for
increased transparency of the approval process for Halal certifications.111 It
also raised concerns as to how SPS measures are applied and developed.112
In view of these, it would be important for the Parties to learn from
CETA’s promotion of transparency of scientific basis. First, it provides
specific transparent provisions that would help understand food safety
requirements in China.113 It would be effective to include a preliminary
briefing of SPS measures, especially Halal certifications. Secondly, it also
includes other transparency requirements regarding changes in the structure
of authorities and scientific opinions in addition to notification procedures
for updates regarding significant food safety issues and changes in disease
status. Thirdly, in response to the Chinese suggestion of a platform for
opinions from interested parties, the Parties should incorporate the requirement
of a comment period from the private sector. Better still, it can provide for a
framework specifically for stimulating constructive inputs as to mechanisms of
the application of SPS measures.
To boost predictability, the Parties would need to consider a different
approach from SPS Agreement Article 5(b). Specifically, instead of
publishing any SPS measure or TBT regulation “at an early stage, when
amendments can still be introduced,” they should consider a requirement
not to implement the concerned SPS or TBT standard at all until it has been
published. This would enable businesses to take precautions to minimize
any food risk that would restrict mutual trade.
Considering the Parties’ past FTAs, they generally affirm the TBT
Agreement. Also, the GCC Guide has taken into account the GCC
members’ various international commitments, including the WTO.
Besides, the GCCSO works to harmonize GCC standards within the
guidelines of the International Organization for Standardization. Notably,
GCC members have expressed their concern about Chinese divergence
from international standards.114 Hence, the Parties recognize international
standards as a prominent consideration for regulatory cooperation.
Regarding conformity assessment procedures, the past FTAs of both
parties generally comprise provisions on equivalence and mutual
recognition. This would suggest that the conformity assessment procedure
in the proposed FTA should adhere to the equivalence principle and the non-

111. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – Minutes of the Meeting, WTO Doc.
WT/TPR/M/333 ¶ 4.67, (May 31, 2016) [hereinafter Saudi Arabia Meeting Minutes].
112. Id. at ¶ 6.4.
113. Villalta Puig & Dalke, supra note 104.
114. China Meeting Minutes, supra note 22 at ¶ 6.3.
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discriminatory principle for consistency.115 In other words, China should
allow exported products that fulfil the GCC standards to access the market
under equally favourable conditions and vice versa. Specifically, China should
recognize the standards adopted by the GCCSO and the GCC Guide despite
distinct technical specifications.
On the other hand, GCC members might face an additional obstacle
arising from the multiple levels of standards set up by the different regulatory
bodies in China.116 As Chinese food safety laws have often been amended and
some standards even conflict with each other,117 the GCC authorities might not
know which is the most updated Chinese food standard to follow when
assessing imports. They might incur additional costs in certifying their
compliance with technical regulations that are not based on the Chinese
authorities for conformity assessment. Meanwhile, China has expressed its
doubt about the notification of technical regulations in the UAE.118
Hence, it would be helpful to consider the WTO-plus provisions on
equivalence and transparency in CETA for reference. Concerning
equivalence, the TBT chapter in CETA contains more specific provisions
regarding recognition of equivalence.119
For instance, information
exchange on the development of similar technical regulations. This would
give GCC members more updated information about technical regulations.
A mutual recognition agreement should be considered when multiple tests
are applied for the same good. Regarding transparency, a provision that
entitles a party to request from the other party its rationale behind
conformity assessment procedures would be worthwhile.120 Better still, the
Parties should consider a provision that imposes an obligation on the
importing party to offer reasons immediately to the exporter in case of
access denial to the exported good as in CETA.121 This would be especially
helpful to GCC processed food exporters by reducing uncertainties and
unnecessary compliance costs. It also caters to small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) that cannot afford expensive mandatory tests.
The second priority issue concerns the food safety and environmental
threats posed by nuclear power development. This area has been identified

115. TBT Agreement, supra note 87 at art. 5.1 & 5.1.1.
116. CHRISTINE E. BOISROBERT ET AL., ENSURING GLOBAL FOOD SAFETY: EXPLORING
GLOBAL HARMONIZATION 60 (Academic Press, 1st ed. 2010).
117. Id.
118. United Arab Emirates Trade Policy Review, supra note 65 at ¶ 247.
119. Villalta Puig & Dalke, supra note 104.
120. ChAFTA, supra note 107 at art. 6.8(4).
121. Villalta Puig & Dalke, supra note 104.
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in the Sino-GCC meeting of 2016.122 China released its first software package
for exports of nuclear power in December 2015.123 Saudi Arabia has signed a
nuclear cooperation agreement to buy technology from China.124
Radioactive waste disposal constitutes an important threat to public
health.125 Also, the improper operation of nuclear reactors can pose nuclear
power accidents that generate radioactive substances that contaminate food,
threatening the health of humans, animals and plants.126 The food safety
threat arisen from nuclear power merits specific consideration in the SPS
chapter. Notably, the UAE and Saudi Arabia both have expressly
identified their need for technical assistance under TBT measures.127 The
proposed FTA would need a specific provision regarding technical
assistance like the one in ChAFTA.128 Reference can be also be made from
ChAFTA provisions regarding risk analysis and joint research on control
strategies as well as other scientific issues.129 As for the proper installation
of nuclear reactors, CETA provisions that deal with the approval of
establishments and facilities would be helpful.130 More importantly,
emergency measures are vital in case of nuclear accidents. The proposed
FTA needs enforceable obligations to notify SPS measures in case of an
emergency within 24 hours. Alternatively, reference can be found in
NZCFTA which includes an obligation to notify orally “with urgency to
contact points” followed by written confirmation within 24 hours where cases
of serious and immediate health concern occur. This requirement would be
vital to prevent nuclear accidents from causing harm to public health.
Nuclear power specifically requires the safe design of nuclear reactors
to avoid environmental threats. Trade in the software of nuclear power

122. ‘Shannon Tiezi, The Elephant in the Room During Xi’s Trip to Saudi Arabia: Iran,
THE DIPLOMAT (Jan. 21, 2016), http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/the-elephant-in-the-roomduring-xis-trip-to-saudi-arabia-iran/.
123. China Releases First Software Package for Nuclear Exports, THE ECONOMIC TIMES
(Dec. 18, 2015), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/business/chinareleases-first-software-package-for-nuclear-power-exports/articleshow/50235122.cms.
124. Sujata Ashwarya, Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Energy Plans: Problems, Prospects and
Politics, GULF RESEARCH MEETING (2016), http://gulfresearchmeeting.net/index.php?pgid
=MTg2&pid=MTA3OQ.
125. Rinkesh, Nuclear Waste Disposal, CONSERVE ENERGY FUTURE (2016),
http://www.conserve-energy-future.com/dangers-and-effects-of-nuclear-waste-disposal.php.
126. John P. Christodouleas, M.D., M.P.H. et al., Short-Term and Long-Term Health Risks of
Nuclear-Power-Plant Accidents, NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 2334, 2334-36 (2011).
127. United Arab Emirates Trade Policy Review, supra note 66 at ¶ 39.
128. ChAFTA, supra note 107 at art. 5.9.
129. ChAFTA, supra note 107 at art. 5.6.
130. Villalta Puig & Dalke, supra note 104.
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technologies should merit specific consideration in the TBT chapter.
Regarding technical regulations, both the Parties are members of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”). As nuclear technology
involves advanced techniques, some hard rules regarding the adoption of
conformity assessment and safety measures of nuclear power should be
specifically provided in the proposed FTA. Reference can be taken from
CETA’s sector-specific TBT measures such as the annex on cooperation
concerning motor vehicle regulations. The regulation of nuclear reactors
might merit coverage in a specific annex in the light of Sino-GCC nuclear
cooperation agreement. As the GCC countries are generally less developed than
China in the nuclear power field,131 this would call for strong capacity-building
measures to assist GCC exporters. It would be wise to incorporate mutual
working group arrangements to cope with difficulties in cooperative regulations.
The Parties can follow ChAFTA to specifically establish committees on SPS and
TBT measures for the better implementation of the chapters.132
Notably, enforceable FTA dispute settlement provisions specifically
for SPS and TBT issues are necessary. ChAFTA uses the wording “shall
endeavor to resolve” in the provisions regarding dispute settlement in SPS
and TBT chapters.133 It is ambiguous as to the “cooperative mechanisms”
referred to in these provisions, thus these provisions are unlikely to be
enforceable. GSFTA contains parallel provisions regarding specific Dispute
Settlement Mechanisms by consultations held “within the framework of the
Joint Committee in order to find an appropriate solution.”134 Such
consultations held by the bilateral committee would be helpful to joint
cooperation of dispute resolution. Besides inclusion of a “Joint Committee,”
the proposed FTA needs to consider enforceable provisions in CETA that
allow a party to show how the other party fails to comply within a comment
period.135 While enforceability is important, the political commitment is the
most decisive factor to accomplish true regulatory convergence.136 This factor is
satisfied because the Parties have expressed their readiness to cooperate
concerning food security in the Sino-GCC strategic dialogue held in 2011.137
131. Mike Orcutt, China Will Soon Leapfrog Traditional Leaders in Nuclear Power,
MIT TECH. REV., July 27, 2015, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/539691/china-willsoon-leapfrog-traditional-leaders-in-nuclear-power.
132. ChAFTA, supra note 107 at art. 5.11, 6.12.
133. ChAFTA, supra note 107 at art. 5.10, 6.12.
134. GSFTA, supra note 103 at art. 2.10(3), 2.11(3).
135. Villalta Puig & Dalke, supra note 104.
136. Id.
137. The Second China-GCC Strategic Dialogue Held in Abu Dhabi, MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, May 5, 2011, http://
www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/yangjiechichufang_665758/t819923.shtml.
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E. Trade in Services
The General Agreement on Trade Services (GATS) provides for the
MFN obligation, which emphasizes the equal treatment of service suppliers
worldwide.138 Two other key obligations are national treatment obligation
and market access obligation.139 There are four modes of supply provided in
GATS Article I. Notably, the third offers opportunities for foreign direct
investment and the fourth allows foreign individuals to enter other customs
territory themselves to provide services.
The first issue concerns whether the proposed FTA should adopt a
positive list or a negative list approach to trade in services. A negative list
approach presumes the liberalization of all sectors except those sensitive
sectors that are explicitly excluded by the trading partners. In contrast, a
positive list approach considers what items to include, one by one. A negative
list leads to deeper liberalization than the positive list. A negative list approach
would be preferred in the proposed FTA based on four main considerations.
First, the Sino-GCC relationship is strategic, implying that mutual
trade liberalization is unlikely to be politically contentious. The Parties
would be comfortable with deep integration. Secondly, both sides are open
to work together to promote the smooth implementation of the OBOR
initiative, which encompasses numerous sectors. Thus, even if the Parties
manage to attain a positive list without missing prominent sectors, the list
would be very long. Thirdly, it would be challenging to decide what to
prioritize because the political and economic environment is constantly
changing. For example, China’s chemical industry has become much more
competitive than in 2009 when Sino-GCC negotiations stalled.140 As China
would consider present opportunities and forecasted trends to decide what
to prioritize, it might overlook emerging service sectors as diversification
becomes more intense and the trade profile of the Parties changes. The
fourth consideration concerns the implicit compromise of the positive
approach, where sectors that are not included in the list would be subject to
the usual trade policy regime.
Chinese service commitments in ChAFTA, have been praised as the
best among its FTAs, excluding its Closer Economic Partnership
Arrangement with Hong Kong (CEPA).141 The incorporation of a MFN
138.
139.
140.
141.

General Agreement on Trade in Services art. II, Apr. 15, 1994 [hereinafter GATS].
Id. at art. XVII, XVI.
Wu, supra note 24.
Kate Axup et al., Focus: The China-Australia Free Trade Agreement, ALLENS
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provision for services and investment in favour of Australia was hailed as
the most prominent innovation in ChAFTA.142 Meanwhile, Chinese MFN
commitments are the deepest among its FTAs.143 Hence, ChAFTA would
serve as good reference for the proposed FTA.
The second major issue concerns the area of cooperation in services
identified in China’s visit to Saudi Arabia this year.144 Notably, China has
viewed the growth in the aviation and tourism sector of the UAE as
remarkable.145 Also, the OBOR initiative would be conducive to such
cooperation, as its main objective is to enhance the connectivity of
infrastructure.146 Apart from these opportunities, four major areas regarding
market access merit specific consideration.
First, cooperation in renewable energy is of the highest priority. The
GCC has ample renewable resources such as abundant sunshine while
China has invested in renewable energy heavily. China was recognized as
the world’s leader in the installation solar plants.147 Hence, Chinese
technology firms can potentially partner with GCC developers on clean
energy projects. To ensure renewable energy can be utilized costeffectively for energy security, the Parties should consider provisions that
set obligatory targets of energy saving to be achieved by the Parties.
Meanwhile, they should negotiate a mechanism for support schemes to help
each other achieve these targets. Reference can be drawn from current EU
PTAs that have been recognized to achieve higher energy independence.148
As for market access provisions in the proposed FTA, they can
exclusively protect the investments of the GCC members in China’s
renewable energy technologies and services derived from such
technologies. Meanwhile, it would be worthwhile to include a provision
that specifically safeguards the investment of Chinese wholly owned
technology firms and regulates risks concerning the construction of renewable
energy-related facilities in the GCC. In this way, China can gain from the

(Nov. 21 2014), http://www.allens.com.au/pubs/asia/foasia21nov14.htm.
142. Interpretation for China-Australia Free Trade Agreement, supra note 46.
143. Axup, supra note 141.
144. Supra note 42.
145. United Arab Emirates Trade Policy Review, supra note 66, at para. 166, 170.
146. What We Can Expect from Xi’s Visit, CCTV (Jan. 19, 2016), http://english.cntv.cn/
2016/01/19/VIDE54wN2CkNkQ4TmTgSyYBg160119.shtml.
147. Richard Martin, China Is on an Epic Solar Power Binge, MIT TECHNOLODGY
REVIEW BLOG, (March 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601093/china-is-on-anepic-solar-power-binge/.
148. Rafael Leal-Arcas et al., Renewables, Preferential Trade Agreements and EU
Energy Security, QUEEN MARY SCH. OF L. & LEGAL STUD., Research Paper No. 208 (2015).
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GCC’s rich resources while the GCC can benefit from Chinese technology.
Secondly, China has highlighted the promotion of cross-border
electronic commerce.149 Moreover, it views the UAE’s telecommunications
market as experiencing rapid growth.150 Thus, it is committed to stimulate
investment in the telecommunications market.151 Meanwhile, Qatar and
Bahrain have liberalized their telecommunications market.152
The
telecommunications market in Saudi Arabia and Oman have been recognized
as prosperous.153 These common preferences favour proactive liberalization in
telecommunications. Chinese commitments to Australia regarding market
access for telecommunications under ChAFTA have been recognized as the
most extensive to date.155 Thus, ChAFTA liberalization measures for
telecommunications would serve as a good reference for the proposed FTA.
The third area concerns the financial sector, especially banking
services. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Bank of China,
and China Construction Bank have established branches in Dubai.156 The
China Development Bank and other banks have plans to establish branches
in the UAE. By establishing a commercial presence China has shown
support for the facilitation of cross-border services to the GCC. Notably,
China has expressed two concerns in the restrictions on the number of
foreign banks allowed and a relaxation of licensing requirements in
UAE.157 Addressing Chinese concerns would boost competition in the
GCC. Yet, keener competition would call for prudential regulation because
of increased risks. Notably, the survival of Islamic banks have been
challenged by the expanded product base in the overbanked market of the
GCC.158 Hence, the proposed FTA should specifically prevent domestic
regulations that safeguard the integrity of the GCC’s financial system. A
similar provision has been adopted in ChAFTA Annex 8-B, Article 3.

149. China Meeting Minutes, supra note 22 at ¶ 3.17.
150. United Arab Emirates Trade Policy Review, supra note 65 at ¶ 262.
151. China Meeting Minutes, supra note 22 at ¶ 2.9.
152. Qatar, Bahrain and Oman – Minutes of the Meeting, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/
M/296 ¶ 12.26 (June 19, 2014).
153. Assessing investment policies of member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council,
supra note 64, at 13.
155. Factsheet: Trade in Services, AUSTL. GOV’T (July 1, 2016), http://dfat.gov.au/
trade/agreements/chafta/fact-sheets/Documents/fact-sheet-trade-in-services.pdf.
156. Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat, Monthly Monitor Report, GULF STATE ANALYTICS (June
2015), http://gulfstateanalytics.com/archives/work/the-uae-and-chinas-thriving-partnership.
157. United Arab Emirates Trade Policy Review, supra note 65 at ¶263.
158. Ahmad Mohammad Abu Qalbein, Challenges of Islamic Banking in Gulf
Corporation Council, 8 EUR. J. OF BUS. & MGMT. 177, 184 (2016).
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The fourth area concerns ChAFTA’s market access commitment in
education. Bahrain is committed to pursue broad education reform,159
while Qatar regards human resource development as paramount.160
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia is committed to improve its education system.161
Importantly, education has been highlighted as a top government priority in
the UAE’s third WTO Trade Policy Review, thereby calling for
considerable investment.162 Education is also one of the key sectors that
China is focused on.163 As the Parties value education services, progressive
liberalization measures in education would merit comprehensive coverage
in the proposed FTA.
Under ChAFTA, a side letter on education services encompasses joint
efforts for future work programs to facilitate student and teacher mobility
between both countries. Likewise, it would be favorable to negotiate a side
letter for future joint efforts to strengthen cooperation in education services
as in ChAFTA. Notably, concrete measures like exchange programs and
the promotion of partner’s educational institutions would enhance access to
the education market. These can build upon the already deep educational
partnership between China and the UAE.164 More importantly, these
exchange programs would potentially enable GCC nationals to have access
to quality education from China. They also help the GCC to address the
educational mismatch between the qualifications of nationals and the needs
of the private sector.165
Nonetheless, unlike Australia, it would be much more challenging for
the Parties to achieve equivalence on four grounds. First, the poor quality
of teachers in the GCC would be the main setback for educational
equivalence with China. Research has shown that GCC countries have
mismanaged the number of teachers.166 They are facing a shortage of

159. Qatar, Bahrain and Oman Meeting Minutes, supra note 152 at ¶ 11.17.
160. Id. at ¶ 3.17.
161. Saudi Arabia Trade Policy Review, supra note 92 at ¶ 260.
162. Trade Policy Review Report by United Arab Emirates, WTO Doc WT/TPR/G/338,
¶ 8.1, 9.4 (Apr. 27, 2016).
163. China Meeting Minutes supra note 22 at ¶ 2.18.
164. Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat, China and the UAE: New Cultural Horizons,
MIDDLE EAST INST. (2015), http://www.mei.edu/content/map/china-and-uae-new-culturalhorizons.
165. MICHAEL STURM ET AL., The Gulf Cooperation Council Countries: Economic
Structures, Recent Developments and Role in the Global Economy, 6-37 (Occasional Paper
Series No. 92, European Central Bank 2008).
166. Michael Barber et al., Improving Education in the Gulf, THE MCKINSEY Q. 39, 40
(2007), https://abujoori.files.wordpress.com/2007/04/improve-gulf-education.pdf.
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skilled teachers.167 Thus, it would be vital for GCC educational institutions
to contract with Chinese institutions for joint training programs and
performance management systems specifically for teacher quality. Secondly,
it would be difficult to achieve recognition of GCC curriculum design in
Chinese universities and colleges due to the differences in educational quality.
The education system in the Gulf is weak,168 whereas Chinese higher
education has become internationalized.169 The courses offered and the level
of certifications granted may not be comparable. Thus much harmonization
work including educational reforms in the GCC would be necessary when
the Parties organize joint exchange programs. Thirdly, both sides have to
face different marketing restrictions for attracting students to join these
exchange programs. While spending on education in the GCC has been
low,170 much spending would be necessary for marketing and recruitment
activities. Fourth, all harmonization work requires a consistently high level
of trust and understanding in the quality of professional standards and
working plans of each other.
Besides education, mutual recognition of licensing requirements is a
common challenge for service sectors, as most licensing and qualification
requirements are different. It would even be more difficult for sectors that
have more than one regulatory authority such as education and financial
services in the GCC. The Parties should negotiate a framework in the
proposed FTA that establishes a working group specifically for negotiating
mutual recognition agreements for licensing, monitoring the information
exchange of different regulatory authorities and assessments of practical
implementations so that capacity building and harmonization can be
achieved simultaneously.
The movement of service suppliers under GATS concerns crossborder service supply. China has a strong capacity of innovation and
technology. Improved access of Chinese skilled workers can help the
GCC countries better manage projects through cooperation. Also, China
has abundant strong contracting experience, which would provide good
support to human resources management.
Nonetheless, there are three challenges faced by the Parties in this
aspect. The first challenge concerns demographic imbalance. Expatriates
167. Those Who Can Do Must Teach: A New Paradigm for Teacher Training in the
GCC, THE IDEATION CENTER (2016), http://www.ideationcenter.com/blog/post/52413053.
168. Barber, et al., supra note 166, at 39.
169. Rahul Choudaha, How China Plans to Become a Global Force in Higher
Education, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/higher-educationnetwork/2015/oct/12/how-china-plans-to-become-a-global-force-in-higher-education.
170. Callen & Cheirf, supra note 29.
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account for the dominant proportion of the workforce in the GCC’s private
sector, leaving many nationals unemployed.171 Unskilled workers make up
the majority of expatriates while skilled workers remain hard to attract and
retain.172 GCC countries lack flexible immigration policies to attract
them.173 The mobility of foreign workers in the GCC is restricted by visa
permits and a sponsorship program, which restricts the freedom of migrant
domestic workers from returning to their home country.174 These concerns are
common to all GCC countries, in particular Qatar.175 They call for provisions
that help to enhance the mobility of Chinese workers especially skilled persons.
Generally, the past FTAs of the Parties contain provisions that offer
improved access for business visitors, contractual service suppliers and intracorporate transferees. They require expeditious application procedures and
transparency provisions. Aside from these general provisions, the proposed
FTA needs to enhance market access for Chinese skilled workers as is the case
under ChAFTA. Also, an Investigation Facilitation Agreement as in ChAFTA
should be adopted in the proposed FTA allowing firms that are substantially
owned by Chinese companies to operate large infrastructure projects in the
GCC on three grounds. First, it should place no limit on workforce size.
Secondly, it should encompass numerous sectors, including
telecommunications and energy supply. Thirdly, it should lower the
threshold for expected capital expenditure. Moreover, China could provide
the GCC with an expatriate labour force to support its growing demand for
infrastructure projects especially those in the OBOR initiative.
Yet, the above provisions would not be as significant if other countries
so not also improve their immigration laws to attract Chinese workers.
Moreover, the GCC countries would face an increased need for Chinese
technological skills as their economies diversify. Notably, Saudi Arabia
has at least decided boldly on paper to grant citizenship to 1,000 skilled
workers annually, while other GCC countries have not considered this path
at all.176 A possible reason why the GCC countries generally do not
171. Callen & Cheirf, supra note 29.
172. Ingo Forstenlechner & Emilie J. Rutledge, The GCC's "Demographic Imbalance":
Perceptions, Realities and Policy Options, MIDDLE EAST POL’Y COUN. (2011),
http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/gccs-demographic-imbalanceperceptions-realities-and-policy-options?print.
173. Qatar, Bahrain and Oman Meeting Minutes, supra note 152 at ¶ 12.30.
174. Caroline Kelly, Facilitating Exploitation: A review of Labour Laws for Domestic
Workers in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries, INT’L TRADE UNION CONFED. (2014),
http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/gcc_legal_and_policy_brief_domestic_workers_final_text
_clean_282_29.pdf..
175. Qatar, Bahrain and Oman Meeting Minutes, supra note 152 at ¶ 13.4.
176. Mohammed Al Asoomi, Attracting Skilled Expatriates to GCC: In Theory, GULF NEWS,
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consider the granting of citizenship may be concerns that their culture may
be diluted by an increased number of Chinese skilled workers in their
workplace. Yet, these worries seem to be unnecessary because Chinese
culture promotes “when in Rome do as the Romans do,” meaning Chinese
workers generally follow the traditions of the GCC countries rather than
introducing their own culture. Also, Chinese Confucianism promotes
harmony. More importantly, it should be noted that the GCC countries are
geographically far away from China. As Chinese people generally place
high value on having a permanent home and stable living, granting of
citizenship is highly likely to be an attractive option for Chinese skilled
workers. Thus, the Parties should adopt Saudi Arabia’s bold decision as a
pilot program and negotiate an implementation plan to extend this program
gradually to all GCC countries. It would then be vital to include a
framework that guides and lays down the pilot program for granting of
citizenship.
Enhancing access of Chinese workers does not mean automatic
equivalence between qualifications without the need for re-qualification.
The second challenge for the Parties would be the mutual recognition of
professional qualifications. It remains uncertain what should be the criteria
for assessing equivalence. Also, it would take much time and effort for
both sides to reach a conclusion on harmonized requirements regarding
diverse standards and procedures. The past FTAs of the Parties seem not to
have an extensive framework for mutual recognition. It would be helpful
for the Parties to refer to CETA, which has been recognized as an ideal
platform for labour mobility.177 It contains a specific chapter that serves as
a guide to the negotiation of agreements on the mutual recognition of
professional qualifications.178 It should be noted that doctors179 and
pilots180 should be given higher priority in the proposed FTA. In addition,
a Committee on Movement of Natural persons, as in ChAFTA, should be
established to smooth the implementation. Professional organizations

Jan. 12, 2012, http://gulfnews.com/business/analysis/attracting-skilled-expatriates-to-gcc-in-the
ory-1.964594.
177. Dan Ilika, Better Labour Mobility Canada’s Biggest CETA Win, Report Says, CANADIAN
MANUFACTURING, July 31, 2014, http://www.canadianmanufacturing.com/in-depth/improvedlabour-mobility-canadas-biggest-ceta-win-report-says.
178. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, art. 11, Can.-E.U., [hereinafter
CETA].
179. Cleofe Maceda, Health Care Sector in GCC Faces Talent Shortage, GULF NEWS, Jan.
10, 2014, http://gulfnews.com/business/sectors/careers/health-care-sector-in-gcc-faces-talentshortage-1.1275896.
180. GCC Aviation – Spreading Wings to the World, AL MASAH CAPITAL MGMT. LTD. (Apr.
2015), http://almasahcapital.com/uploads/report/pdf/report_134.pdf.
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should be required to lead the committee on mutual recognition, as they
have better knowledge of the concrete criteria for assessments and
qualifications. The Parties should assign a specific mandate to the committee
for devising measures for ongoing equivalence as well.
The third challenge would be the transparency of qualifications. General
transparency provisions require the prompt publication of materials,
mechanisms to respond to inquiries and notification of amendment of
immigration measures to interested persons. Due to the weak administrative
capacities of GCC governments,181 the handling of publications and inquiries
are inefficient. Hence, exhortative provisions encouraging the Parties to
‘consult relevant bodies’ to negotiate ‘mutually acceptable’ criteria for
licensing and qualifications would be helpful. Model provisions can be found
in Annex 1210.5 of the North American Free Trade Agreement.

F. Investment
The major investment issue concerns the internationalization of the
Renminbi (“RMB”). All GCC countries, except Bahrain, are members of
Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank (AIIB).182 This provides an avenue to
Chinese worthy investments. The AIIB would promote the internationalization
of RMB.183 According to the RMB International Report 2015 by Renmin
University, RMB internationalization strengthens economic integration. Thus,
the RMB should be adopted to settle trade.184 The Parties should consider
adding express provisions to promote cooperation among the central banks
and to establish RMB exchange arrangements in order to enhance the
availability of the RMB and the issuing of RMB denominated bonds by
GCC investors.
Besides the redback issue, strong mutual investment interests between
the Parties present an opportunity for the liberalization of investment flows.
Apart from investments in infrastructure and engineering projects required
by the OBOR initiative, China invests in oil exploration and production in
the GCC while the GCC countries invest in Chinese oil refining and
petrochemical sectors.185 On the other hand, most GCC countries have

181. Abdulrazzaq & Carey, supra note 27.
182. Adam Bouyamourn, UAE signs up as founding member of Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank, The national business (2015) < http://www.thenational.ae/business/bankin
g/uae-signs-up-as-founding-member-of-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank>.
183. Daojiong, supra note 2, at 101.
184. Saidi, supra note 4.
185. China Meeting Minutes, supra note 22 at ¶ 4.294.
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sovereign wealth funds. Since the financial crisis, GCC investments have
turned from Europe to China.186 Notably, wealthy investors from Saudi
Arabia and the UAE are interested in investment opportunities in China.187
First, the Saudization program imposed a huge barrier to foreign
investments by mandating prior approvals.188 China challenged the
mandatory stake of local holding and minimum capital requirement in
Saudi Arabia.189 Restrictions of foreign ownership in some sectors have
been reiterated as the main concern at the latest policy review meeting of
Saudi Arabia.190 Notably, China also criticized the 49% cap of foreign
ownership in Qatar and the UAE as overly restrictive.191 On the other
hand, the GCC countries complain about the tedious procedure of
verification and approval for investments in China.192 Hence, the Parties
need to impose specific obligations on each other to relax investment
restrictions particularly those on foreign ownership in some sectors. A
model provision can be found in Article 173(b) under NZCFTA.
The second challenge would be the limited investment capacity and
market intelligence of SMEs. They may not have full access to investment
policies. China has made commitments to stimulate the growth of
SMEs.193 GCC members like Saudi Arabia have emphasized the
importance of consistency in the implementation of regulations that govern
the business environment of SMEs.194 About 90% of all businesses in
Saudi Arabia are SMEs.195 They are also important in Bahrain.196
Meanwhile, the UAE is committed to strengthen SMEs through innovative
technologies.197 These reveal the mutual interests of the Parties to boost
SMEs’ capacity and foster a good business environment for their growth.
Thus, it would be mutually beneficial for the proposed FTA to include a
specific article that enables cooperation for the promotion of SME investments.
A model provision can be found in NZCFTA, which specifically promotes a
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188.
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Saudi Arabia Trade Policy Review, supra note 92 at ¶ 36.
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Id. at ¶ 2.9.
Id. at ¶ 6.3.
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“favourable trading environment” for SMEs.198
The third challenge arises from the utmost importance of transparency
perceived by both sides. China has requested Saudi Arabia to offer more
transparency in formulating investment policies.199 Also, China has called
on Bahrain to make investment regulations more transparent and
predictable.200 Meanwhile, GCC members have requested China to publish
measures concerning investment.201 Bahrain has reiterated the importance
of private sector opinions when devising new regulations on behalf of the
GCC.202 Hence, transparency provisions requiring the prompt publication of
investment measures would be essential. Requirements to notify private
investors for comments regarding any enactment or amendment of regulations
should also be included in the proposed FTA in response to Bahrain’s view.
Nonetheless, securing an FTA with provisions protecting Chinese
investments may prove difficult where trading partners have strong
investment interests in China.203 As numerous resource sectors in the GCC
are state-owned, it would be burdensome for China to negotiate with the
GCC on investment rights because state-owned enterprises in the GCC
have strong interests, especially China’s petrochemical sector. Hence, the
proposed FTA should include a framework that facilitates cooperation
between Chinese state owned enterprises with those in the GCC for the
better negotiation of investment rights.
An investor-state dispute settlement mechanism (ISDSM) would be
vital for the proposed FTA because of the expected flow of investments
between the Parties. Article 9 of ChAFTA provides for ISDSM, while
GSFTA includes no such protection. The ChAFTA ISDSM offers narrow
protection to foreign investors.204 It only enables foreign investors from
either country to claim compensation for breach of the national treatment
obligation by the other Party, subject to certain restrictions.205 Notably, it
does not contain a ‘fair and equitable treatment’ provisions. The ISDSM in

198. NZCFTA, supra note 98 at art. 176.
199. Saudi Arabia Trade Policy Review, supra note 92 at ¶ 89.
200. Qatar, Bahrain and Oman Meeting Minutes, supra note 152 at ¶9.26.
201. Saudi Arabia, China Issue Joint Communiqué on Establishing Comprehensive
Strategic Partnership Between the Two Countries, supra note 22 at ¶ 4.95.
202. Saudi Arabia Trade Policy Review, supra note 106 at ¶ 220.
203. Christopher M. Dent, China’s Investment Provisions in its Free Trade Agreements,
ECRAN, 10 (Short Term Policy Brief 43, Feb. 2012).
204. Daisy Mallet & James McKenzie, ISDS in ChAFTA – Where’s the beef?, KING &
WOOD MALLISONS (2015), http://www.kwm.com/en/uk/knowledge/insights/isds-in-chaftawheres-the-beef-20151015.
205. ChAFTA, supra note 107 at art. 9.3.
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ChAFTA might not serve as a good reference for the proposed FTA.
The ISDSM in CETA would serve as a model provision, since it has
been recognized as the most innovative arrangement for the protection of
investments.206 Two main aspects would be particularly helpful for the
proposed FTA. First, CETA’s ISDSM lays out precisely the clear standard
of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ in Article 9 without room for the discretion
of arbitrators. It provides higher predictability by laying down the factors
that constitute a breach of the obligation. Secondly, in anticipation of
increasing investment flows between the Parties, it would be necessary to
incorporate the fast track objection procedure in Articles 20 and 30 of
CETA in order to screen out frivolous claims and prevent abuse.
For transparency and predictability purposes, it would be helpful to
highlight two CETA provisions. First, the proposed FTA should include
specific provisions that enable an appellate tribunal to review legal or
factual errors of arbitral awards in order to enhance predictability in the
interpretation of investment protection provisions.207 Also, it should allow
amicus curiae submissions from interested third parties if they can help
determine the issues,208 thereby increasing procedural transparency.

G. Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
Most Dispute Settlement Mechanisms (“DSMs”) in Chinese FTAs,
except CEPA, are mainly modeled on the WTO DSM.209 ChAFTA and
GSFTA are no exception. Modelling closely on WTO system would
incorporate a comprehensive enforcement mechanism that is deemed to be
ruled-based and credible.210
In the WTO DSM, the early stages are based on a diplomatic approach
where good offices, conciliation or mediation may be “requested at any
time” and “undertaken voluntarily” if the disputants agree.211
If
consultations have not been entered or fail within 60 days, a legalistic
mechanism is adopted where disputants agree on convening an ad hoc
206. Investment Provisions in the EU-Canada Free Trade Agreement (CETA), EUR.
COMM’N (2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151918.pdf.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Francis Snyder, China, Regional Trade Agreements and WTO Law, 43 J. OF WORLD
TRADE. 1, 1-57 (2009).
210. REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 346 (Lorand Bartels
& Frederico Ortino eds., Oxford Sholarship Online 2012).
211. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governining the Settlement of Disputes art.
5(1), 5(3), Apr. 5, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
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panel. The panel will then issue a final report.
The first issue in devising a DSM is whether it should be based on a
diplomatic or legalistic mechanism.212 Diplomatic dispute settlement
favours only consultations without legal provisions. Disputants may refer
disputes to either third-party adjudicators or a political body for consultation.
A legalistic mechanism refers to ad hoc referral to an arbitral tribunal as in the
WTO DSM. Both mechanisms have their own merits and drawbacks.
Legalistic DSM poses two main challenges to the negotiation of the
proposed FTA. The first challenge stems from political economic constraints.
First, academics have asserted that a legalistic DSM would undermine the
power and political autonomy of national governments.213 The Chinese
government views law as a means of control and would be unlikely to support
a legalistic mechanism that promotes rule of law. Meanwhile, the GCC
governments are monarchies and do not care much for human rights. Indeed,
the separation of powers is not a practice in the GCC. Secondly, the Chinese
government perceives litigation with other countries as a setback to
diplomatic ties.214 Litigation seems to run counter to China’s “going out
strategy,” which promotes further economic integration with the outside
world. Hence, legally binding forms of DSM, including litigation and
arbitration, seem to be contrary to the political will.
The second challenge arises from the Chinese Confucianism. China
has a long history of mediation based partly on Confucianism, which
proposes cordiality in commercial and personal deals. Since Confucian
ideas have great influence on Chinese policies,215 Chinese people generally
think that litigation can adversely interfere with social harmony for two
reasons. First, Chinese people generally believe that litigation is an
indication of hostility rather than an avenue to resolve disputes. Although
the rule of law is supposed to be objective, litigation becomes the
profession of a desire to win when the respective advocates both believe
that the law supports their arguments.216 Secondly, a winning party may
still be condemned even if it wins a case. Most Chinese people believe that
212. AMELIA PORGES, PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT: A
HANDBOOK 474 (World Bank Group 2011).
213. James McCall Smith, The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in
Regional Trade Pacts, 54 INT’L ORG. 137, 145 (2000).
214. MING JIANGLI, CHINA JOINS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: COOPERATION AND
CONTENTIONS 84 (Lexington Books 2012).
215. Razeen Sappideen & Ling Ling He, Dispute Settlement Under Free Trade
Agreements: The Proposed Australia-China Free Trade Agreement, 12 J. OF WORLD INV. &
TRADE 581, 595-96 (2011).
216. Claude Barfield, WTO Dispute Settlement System in Need of Change, 37 INTERECONOMICS
131-135 (2002).
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litigation would cause disputants to “lose face.” As Confucianism regards
litigation to be a last resort, the commencement of legal proceedings would
indicate a dispute to be so serious that it cannot be settled without incurring
legal cost and time. Regardless of the ruling, the relations of the disputants
would have deteriorated during proceedings.
On the other hand, litigation provides more predictability and
certainty. It enables a disputant to gain full discovery of the arguments of
the opposite case. Arbitration has been hailed as a more workable DSM in
China.217 Meanwhile, the GCC countries have the Unified Arbitration Law
of 2009, recognizing arbitration in the GCC. Arbitration seems to address
the above Confucian concerns. First, arbitration enables disputants to select
an arbitrator by agreement and both sides take part in the resolution process.
There might be some forms of cooperation between the disputants, giving
them significant flexibility for parties to tailor their DSM according to their
needs. Thus, it preserves their relationship under a cooperative framework.
Second, arbitration is a private process that ensures greater confidentiality
than litigation. Parties can protect their sensitive information from
disclosure to the public. Therefore, disputants do not have to worry about
losing their reputation.
Nonetheless, disputes arising from cultural differences may be
challenging to resolve and may remain unsettled long after arbitration.
Worse still, some cultural principles might have to be compromised.
Arbitrators might even face a dilemma when deciding which value should
prevail based on a broad notion of justice. Hence, the proposed FTA
should incorporate a code of conduct for arbitrators, one that upholds their
independence and impartiality. Still, the standard adopted by the arbitrator
is still subject to perceptions and how they weigh in on the arguments.
These disadvantages of arbitration might call for a mechanism that
increases the parties’ involvement in the solution.
Diplomatic DSM comprises consultations or conciliation, involving an
impartial third party who will suggest a settlement for the parties to agree
on. It enables the parties to negotiate flexible solutions that are more
mutually amicable. Thus, parties are more likely to voluntarily comply
with the obligations arising from the solution. Also, negotiators generally
perceive alternative dispute resolution to be a rewarding experience as
evidenced by its wide adoption.218 However, this mechanism does not
enable full discovery and access to a formal judicial system, thus it may be
harder to reach decisions.

217. Sappideen, supra note 215.
218. ChAFTA, supra note 108 at art. 15.6; GSFTA, supra note 104 at art. 9.3.
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In view of these considerations, the DSM for the proposed FTA
should balance the importance of formality and the flexibility to cater to
pragmatic needs. Thus, the DSM of the proposed FTA should be closely
modelled on the WTO DSM, which provides for both diplomatic and
legalistic approaches of dispute settlement in incremental stages.
It would be helpful to consider the nature of future disputes to tailor
the mechanism and enhance the resolution of disputes arising from the
proposed FTA. The Parties have agreed to commit to extensive market
access in services trade, an area of potential conflict. Moreover, conflicts
concerning divergent customs, procedures, and jurisdictional issues would
arise from efforts to cooperate on technical standards for OBOR related
infrastructure projects. In addition, the Parties have signed other FTAs
with other countries before this proposed FTA. Possibly, jurisdictions may
overlap for certain breaches concerning several FTAs.
In view of these potential conflicts, the DSM should also allow for
diversity. Diverse disputes would call for higher flexibility and expediency
in the DSM. First, it would be helpful to refer to Article 15.4(2) of
ChAFTA for the right to select a suitable forum and Article 14.3(2) of
CETA for the exception. The “choice of forum” and the right to use the
chosen forum ‘to the exclusion of others’ provide more flexibility and
avoid recurrence of disputes due to unresolved jurisdictional issues. For
more comprehensiveness, the proposed FTA may incorporate the exception
in Article 14.3(2) of CETA where the same breach can be brought in
another forum when the chosen forum fails to make a finding for
procedural and jurisdictional reasons.
In response to food safety issues, a specific provision for urgent
proceedings concerning “perishable or seasonable goods” may be
particularly helpful for the proposed FTA. To increase legal predictability,
it would be necessary to provide a clear definition of “perishable” or, at the
very least, guidance for interpretation. Reference can be drawn from
Article 29.4(4) of CETA.
While the proposed FTA would be modelled on the WTO DSM and
thus it would contain similar provisions regarding “role of experts,”219
predictability and consistency are necessary for quality of the panel
process. The Parties can consider two WTO-plus provisions that have been
adopted by China’s FTAs. First, for procedural consistency, the DSM of
the proposed FTA should prescribe model rules of procedure, such as
written submissions and hearings for the arbitral tribunal to follow as in

219. DSU, supra note 211 at art. 13.2.
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ChAFTA.220 Secondly, higher consensual elements may be incorporated to
boost predictability. The proposed FTA needs a provision, as in NZCFTA,
which enables the disputants to comment on technical advice and the
arbitral tribunal to takes their comments into account.221
Enforceability is essential for an effective DSM. The WTO DSM
does not guarantee that the defendant will comply with the panel ruling. It
only provides a final report as to which disputant is wrong.222 The
complainant can only self-enforce a ruling by requesting negotiations for
compensation or authorization from the Dispute Settlement Body to retaliate
by suspending concessions. The effectiveness of panel rulings in the WTO
DSM seem to depend on the ability of the disputants to self-enforce.
While the proposed FTA would be modelled on WTO, it may consider
adding three main WTO-plus features to the compliance procedure of the
arbitration panel’s decision with reference to GSFTA. First, it should
provide an alternative route for the complaining party to enter into
negotiation with the party in breach of the agreement to “develop mutually
acceptable compensation.”223 This favors Chinese Confucianism practices,
which prefer amicable negotiations before resort is made to the arbitration
panel to suspend concessions. Secondly, upon the suspension of concessions,
the proposed FTA should address possible disputes regarding whether the
level of suspension is overly excessive by the original arbitral panel.224
This provides a more comprehensive enforcement mechanism, which
safeguards the interests of the defendant if it believes that the level of
compliance is too excessive notwithstanding its willingness to comply.
Thirdly, the proposed FTA should offer certainty and predictability by
stating that the award of the arbitration panel is “final and binding.”225
Better still, to boost the efficiency of the DSM, a slight variation
regarding the suspension of concessions contained in CSFTA is
noteworthy.226 By adopting such variation, the proposed FTA can entitle
the arbitral panel to rule on the level of suspension when it conducts a
compliance review.

220. ChAFTA, supra note 107 at annex 15-B.
221. NZCFTA, supra note 98 at art. 191(5).
222. Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early
Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes, 24 FORDHAM INT’L LAW J. 158, 159-165 (2000).
223. GSFTA, supra note 103 at art. 9.9(1).
224. Id. at art. 9.9(5).
225. GSFTA, supra note 103 at art. 9.8; ChAFTA, supra note 107 at art. 15.16(7).
226. China-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, China-Sing., art. 102(3), Jan. 1, 2009.
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V. Conclusion
Labor-abundant China and oil-rich GCC countries have been
diversifying their energy relations beyond oil recently, boosting their
growth prospects in manifold sectors. China’s OBOR initiative potentially
opens up gateways for Sino-GCC relations in numerous sectors. Moreover,
the GCC countries’ high dependence on expatriates creates opportunities
for China’s excess industrial capacities. Besides a favorable political
economy and strong political commitment, the Parties do not have any dispute
over human rights, which is the main setback to EU-GCC FTA negotiations.
Moreover, they have pledged to work together to protect their security ties,
especially the OBOR lanes and the settlement of the Syria conflict.
Nonetheless, there are still challenges that the Parties need to
overcome, especially the attainment of mutual recognition in various
service areas because of the low educational standards and restrictive
immigration policies of the GCC countries. Moreover, the Parties
emphasize the need for increased transparency in diverse areas, including
conformity assessment procedures, investment regulations, licensing
requirements and China’s scientific justifications of SPS measures. The
various laws and issues involved in OBOR related projects would call for a
DSM and an ISDSM that ensure certainty and efficiency.
While the proposed FTA would be modelled on the WTO framework
as in past FTAs, it can address its specific challenges with reference to
WTO-plus provisions, especially in ChAFTA for services trade and
GSFTA for DSM. Meanwhile, CETA innovations for Mode 4 services,
investments, ISDSM, SPS and TBT issues would be helpful. The proposed
FTA should include a framework requiring positive actions to create
investment opportunities, a platform for inputs from the private sector for
increased transparency, a prominent role for professional organizations in
equivalence, and the granting of citizenship for Chinese skilled workers.
On the whole, capacity building should be the ongoing key for overcoming
the challenges and realizing the opportunities of the proposed FTA given
the importance of technical cooperation in most high priority areas,
especially nuclear development, green energy, and education.

